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OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

A public defender system or a plan for court-appointed, state-paid
counsel for indigents would be expensive. But the law has long acknowledged society's interest in protecting the innocent. Can an impartial judge adequately protect the rights of an indigent appearing
without counsel? Mr. Justice Sutherland, quoted above, thought not,
and a number of Florida circuit judges agree. Remedial legislation
25
seems long overdue.
If the Florida Legislature does act to make counsel appointment
mandatory in noncapital cases, consideration should be given to the
question of whether the defendant need volunteer a request to have
counsel appointed. It is conceivable that, even though a defendant
be given the right to counsel, he may, through ignorance of this right,
fail to make a request. In this respect, a statute similar to Federal
Rule 44, which requires appointment of counsel unless defendant
objects, seems desirable.
After reading some of the cases in which right to counsel has been
denied, one can not help but feel that the present state of the law
in Florida is uncomfortably reminiscent of the single commandment
ultimately imposed by communal leaders in George Orwell's Animal
Farm: "All animals are equal but some animals are more equal than
others."

2

6

TIMOTHY P. POULTON

SUPERSESSION OF STATE SEDITION LAWS BY
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
"[Oin the part of the [President]," asserted Congressman Matthew
Lyon in 1798, "every consideration of the public welfare [is] swallowed up in a continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst
for ridiculous pomp, foolish adultation, and selfish avarice."' For
25The Florida Legislature passed a population act in 1955 that permits counties
with populations exceeding 480,000 (Dade County) to have a public defender.
FLA. GEN. LAWS c. 30143. This is a step in the right direction, but even a statewide law of local option nature is not a satisfactory substitute for a general law
with mandatory provisions.
26At 122 (1946).

'Lyon's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8646, at 1183 (C.C.D. Vt. 1798).
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this statement Congressman Lyon was indicted, convicted, and sent
to prison under America's first sedition act.2 Since then much water

has gone under the bridge; men have been tried and imprisoned for
public utterances under laws propounding a farrago of definitions for
that elusive word sedition. An attempt to find a suitable meaning for
this term, however, is not within the scope of this note. Indeed, such
an ambitious undertaking would uncover, from the more than forty
state sedition laws, an almost equal number of definitions for this type
of conduct. 3 The concern here is with the legality of any state efforts
in this field, with emphasis on Florida, in view of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in the much publicized case of Pennsylvania
v. Nelson. 4 A long, if sporadic, association of the federal and state
governments in the prosecution of this crime appears to be coming
to an end.
Action by the states to punish sedition was almost unknown before the conflicts of industrialization brought forth a rash of statutes
in the earlier part of this century. 5 Historically, spates of sedition

laws have appeared in times of domestic unrest and contention or
external military threat. The Haymarket bombing in 1886 and the
assassination of President McKinley in 1902 led to the first state sedition law, the New York Criminal Anarchy Act. This effort inspired
similar action by a small number of states circa 19006 and a subsequent re-entrance into the field by the federal government. 7 Later
sedition acts bloomed during the tumult of World War 1,8 at which
time advocating heavier taxation instead of bond issues became a
2Alien and Sedition Act, I STAT. 570 (1798).
Sin some jurisdictions sedition consists of intentional advocacy of violent overthrow of democratic government, while in others "suggesting" disaffection toward
the government or mere unknowing membership in a "subversive" organization is
a crime.
4350 U.S. 497 (1956).
5Exceptions are Southern statutes passed in the pre-Civil War period to curb
inflammatory speech designed to incite resistance among the slaves. For discussion
see EMERSON and HADER,

POLITICAL AND

CiviL

RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

371-75

(1952).
6WASH. REv. CODE §9.81.020 (1951) (passed in 1909); Wis. STAT. §347.14 (1955)
(passed in 1903).
7The Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §2385 (1952), was patterned after the earlier New
York law.
sSome of the more stringent acts were Mont. Laws 1918, c. 11, and Minn. Laws
1917, c. 463. For a detailed discussion of the subject see CHEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE
UNITED STATES

36-107 (1954).
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criminal act, 9 as well as criticizing the YMCA,l ° or stating that war
was contrary to the teaching of Christ." Action by the states supplemented the already existing Federal Espionage Act.' 2 In most cases
the state laws outdid their federal counterparts, which were apparently
deemed inadequate. In 1918, for example, the Minnesota court held
that it was a crime, under that state's espionage act, to attempt to
thwart the efforts of women knitting clothes for the war by the com13
ment, "No soldier ever sees these socks."
4
By 1921 two thirds of the states had enacted sedition legislation.1
During the prosperous 'twenties prosecutions dropped sharply, but
with the onslaught of the depression the rules as to what could safely
be advocated again bore watching. The United States Supreme Court,
however, beginning in 1931,15 evolved a body of precedent, under
the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and press, that was
to sharply curtail unbridled government power in this field, whether
under state or federal law.16 Concurrent prosecution of sedition by
the two levels of government continued within these bounds down to
the cataclysmic pronouncement of the Nelson decision.
PENNSYLVANIA V. NELSON

Reverberations were felt in nearly every attorney general's office
in the country when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in January 1954
held that federal legislation had superseded the state's sedition act. 1"
The lower court's conviction of Steve Nelson, a high Communist
Party official, for advocating violent overthrow of the federal government was reversed in an opinion construing the intent of Congress in
proscribing sedition under the Smith Act. s Far from requiring
federal legislation to expressly pre-empt the field in which it applies,
9See

CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES

51 (1954).

IoSee United States v. Nagler, 252 Fed. 217 (W.D. Wis. 1918), rev'd on other
grounds, 254 U.S. 661 (1920).
lShaffer v. United States, 255 Fed. 886 (9th Cir. 1919).
1240 STAT. 217 (1917).

"3State v. Freerks, 140 Minn. 349, 350, 168 N.W. 23, 24 (1918).
14E.g., COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §21 (1935); IND. STAT. ANN. §10-1302 (Burns 1956);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:148-13 (1951).
15Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
16See CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 9, c. 11; EMERSON and HABER, op. cit. supra note
5, at 384-428.
"Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
1818 U.S.C. §2385 (1952).
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the majority justices held that such intent may be implied from the
mere pervasiveness of the statute, adding further that "readily does
the inference of federal pre-emption arise."", This inference must have
20
been strong indeed, in view of Title 18 of the United States Code,
which provides: "Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or
impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the
21
laws thereof."'
There have been four criteria, the court stated, for determining
the intent of Congress regarding pre-emption when it was not expressly made clear:
2
(1) All-inclusive nature of the federal statute law.2
23
(2) Dominance of federal interest in the particular field.
(3) Object sought to be obtained and obligations imposed by
24
the statute.
5
(4) Conflicts between the federal statute and the state law.2

The Pennsylvania court concluded that sedition is a national crime
the suppression of which federal law must control, and moreover
control exclusively, if it is to be effective.
The United States Supreme Court granted the state's petition
for certiorari.26 At this time amici curiae briefs appeared from every
corner of the country, mostly submitted by aroused state attorneys general, to urge that the state laws be left intact. In a six-to-three opinion
the Court nevertheless affirmed the Pennsylvania holding.27
Noting that the states have power to enforce sedition laws unless
the federal government has occupied the field, the majority found
the area at that time exhaustively covered by federal law. On previous
occasions it had ruled that such pervasiveness gave rise to a strong
inference of pre-emption. 2 Here, the dominance of the federal interest
'OCommonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 66, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
20See id. at 519 (dissenting opinion).
2118 U.S.C. §3231 (1952).
22Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
2SHines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
24Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
25HilI v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
26Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 348 U.S. 814 (1954).
27Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
2sRice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
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also was determinative: "[Olur attention has not been called to any
case where the prosecution has been successfully directed against an
29
attempt to destroy state or local government."
Further, with the states prosecuting sedition against the federal
government, the danger of mutual interference presented itself. A
crime of such broad scope cannot be attacked piecemeal. It has been
argued that the invaluable aid of agents such as Herbert A. Philbrick
in the Dennis3° prosecutions could have been seriously impaired had
their operations been prematurely exposed in state proceedings by
testimony while under subpoena. 31 In his brief for the United States
as amicus curiae, the Attorney General, although favoring continued
32
state prosecution, conceded that full state co-operation was necessary.
The Court felt that the most efficient protection of the country demanded one system of investigation, detection, and prosecution.
A number of laws containing vague admonitions not to "excite
ill feeling against the United States" 3 or "suggest" overthrow by
violence 34 can hardly be said to comply with the requirement of statutory clarity as to what conduct constitutes a crime. Further, penalty
provisions present a problem. The wide divergence of these is
graphically illustrated by defendant Nelson's sentence of twenty years
imprisonment by the Pennsylvania lower court, contrasted with a
five-year sentence in the federal proceeding for the same crime.35
There is also wide disagreement among the states as to what is seditious. Chief Justice Warren's comparison, in the majority opinion,
of the Florida and federal code provisions as to membership in subversive organizations illustrates the varying rules as to what acts are
punishable in the different jurisdictions. In Florida, for instance, a
ten-year sentence may be imposed for an act that would not be considered sedition in the federal courts. 6 The question of who can
at 508.
30Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
"'Note, 31 IN. L.J. 270, 284 (1956).
32Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 31, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350
U.S. 497 (1956).
29350 U.S.

3ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. §65-11-1 (1949).

§432.030 (1955).
"5United States v. Mesarosh, 116 F. Supp. 345 (WV.D. Pa. 1953), af'd, 223 F.2d
449 (3d Cir.), rev'd, 352 U.S. 1 (1955).
36FLA. STAT. §876.02 (1957) provides a maximum of ten years imprisonment for
mere membership in a "communistic" organization. 50 U.S.C. §783 (f) reads:
"Neither the holding of office nor membership in any Communist organization
shall constitute ...a violation .... "
34Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
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initiate an indictment has also received different treatment in the
various states. The Supreme Court regarded as potentially dangerous
the Pennsylvania provision allowing an indictment for sedition
founded upon an information made by a private individual: "The
opportunity thus present for the indulgence of personal spite and
hatred or for furthering some selfish advantage or ambition need only
3
be mentioned to be appreciated." 7
The opinion relied heavily on the Court's reasoning in the previous
case of Hines v. Davidowitz,3 in which a state alien registration
statute was invalidated on the pre-emption theory. In 1940 Congress
had passed the Federal Alien Registration Act; and this, together
with the immigration and naturalization laws, exhaustively controlled the regulation of aliens. The dominance of the national interest in dealing with aliens and the fact that these dealings involve
relations with foreign sovereignties were held to lodge exclusive responsibility in this area with the federal government. There is much
to be said for the analogous argument that sedition, practically speaking, is a national crime; it is not very probable that the communist
conspiracy would attempt by violence to set up a police state in Nebraska or a totalitarian regime in San Antonio. Nevertheless, the
applicability of Hines v. Davidowitz to sedition is debatable. That
case relied principally on the power of the federal government to deal
exclusively with matters affecting foreign sovereignties. This problem
does not present itself in a sedition context. Certainly no foreign state
need be concerned with the methods this country uses in prosecuting
sedition among its citizens. Further, no constitutional sanction of
exclusive jurisdiction can be gleaned in this area as opposed to the
field of foreign affairs. For this reason, the reliance on Mr. Justice
Douglas's reasoning in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.39 is also tenuous. In that case the question of interstate commerce was involved,
and again the power of Congress to regulate is expressly made dear
in the Constitution.
The prior affirmance of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
over sedition in Fox v. Ohio4o and Gilbert v. Minnesota4l was distinguished by the limited scope of the state statutes involved. In the
37350

U.S. at 507, quoting Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 74, 104 A.2d

133, 141 (1954).
s8312 U.S. 52 (1941).
39331 U.S. 218 (1947).
4046 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).

41254 U.S. 325 (1920).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/4

6

Canaday: Supersession of State Sedition Laws by Federal Legislation
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

former case the federal power to punish counterfeiting was held not
impinged upon, since the state offense was based on fraud by passing
spurious money. In the latter case a law proscribing any action which
would hinder military or naval enlistments in the State of Minnesota
was held a local police measure not encroaching upon the exclusive
federal power to raise and maintain armies. The well-known sedition
cases of Gitlow v. New York 42 and Whitney v. California43 were
clearly inapposite, as the pre-emption question was not raised.
Immediately following the Nelson decision the clamor of many
state prosecutors was supplemented by several protestations from
Congress. Representative Howard Smith of Virginia, sponsor of the
act in question, was among the vehement critics of the holding, em4
phatically disclaiming any intent to supersede : 4
"May I say that when I read this opinion, it was the first
intimation I ever had, either in preparation of the act, or in
hearings before the Judiciary Committee, or debates in the
House ... that Congress ever had the faintest notion of nullifying the concurrent jurisdiction of the respective sovereign
states .... "
The statement is clear enough. The intent of Congress, however, and
not that of any lesser group or individual, was the object of the
Court's search. It is perhaps significant that the dissenting congressmen have been unable, in several attempts during the three sessions
of Congress since the decision was handed down, to find a majority
willing to prescribe the intent as they see it. The United States Attorney General also has gone on record as opposing a change in the
45
Court's construction.
All this tends to mitigate the argument that the Court threw all
caution and judicial propriety to the winds, though legislative inaction in 1958 is not necessarily indicative of legislative intent in
1940. In view of Congress's prior express intention not to "impair
the jurisdiction" of the states through Title 18, the Court's holding
that the sedition provision therein nullifies state authority is pre42268 U.S. 652 (1925).
43274 U.S. 357 (1927).
44Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate to Investigate the Administration of Internal Security Laws, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11 (1956).
45Christian Science Monitor, April 3, 1958, p. 3, col. 5.
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tentious, to say the least. Policy arguments for uniformity are very
persuasive, but one cannot help thinking that these arguments apply
to any situation involving concurrent criminal law enforcement and
that Congress must have realized this in providing that state jurisdiction remain unimpaired.
EFFECT OF THE NELSON CASE UPON FLORIDA LEGISLATION

Along with forty-one other states, Alaska, and Hawaii, Florida has
extensive legislation dealing with the general subject of sedition. 46
Inspired by the Smith Act of 1940, the legislature in 1941 made it a
felony to advocate the doctrines of "criminal anarchy," "criminal
communism," or "criminal naziism" and to become a member of any
organization promoting such ideas.4 The general plan is that of the
Smith Act, and the Florida Supreme Court has held that interpretation of the state law should follow the federal courts' interpretation
of the Smith Act. 48 One important element, however, is missing in
the state statute. The federal law ends with the phrase, "becomes or
is a member of . . . any such society, group or assembly of persons,
knowing the purposes thereof .... 49 Is membership without knowledge punishable under the Florida statute? Probably so, in spite of the
federal courts' having construed the Smith Act otherwise 50 and the
Florida Court's having held that supporting the Communist Party
without knowledge does not violate the state's anti-communist loyalty
oath.5 ' At least Chief Justice Warren, as noted earlier, is of the opinion that membership per se is a felony under the Florida law. 52
In 1949 a loyalty oath for all state employees and candidates for
public office was added to the sedition statutes, 53 and in 1953 "subversive activities and organizations" themselves were proscribed; 54
membership in such organizations was again prohibited, but the additional requirement that one be a "knowing" member was added
4OFLA. STAT. §§876.01-.11, .22-.30 (1957).
471d. §876.02 (5).
48
State ex rel. Feldman v. Kelly, 76 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1954).
4918 U.S.C. §2385 (1952). (Emphasis added.)
5oScales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
355 U.S. 1 (1957).
-iState v. Diez, 97 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
52350 U.S. at 508.
53FLA. STAT. §876.05 (1957).
54Id. §876.26.
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to the newer section.55 In all, there are now over fifteen sections in

the Florida statutes dealing with different aspects of sedition. The
question of course arises, since the Nelson decision, as to what parts
of the sedition statutes, if any, continue to be enforceable.
In the latter part of 1957 the Florida Supreme Court was presented
with the problem of determining the breadth of Pennsylvania v.
Nelson. In State v. Diez56 a prosecution for perjury in connection

with the loyalty oath section of the Florida sedition law was defended on the ground, among others, that the whole act had been
nullified by the Nelson case. The Florida Court refused to extend
the Nelson reasoning that far, stating that in approving the state's
loyalty oath it was "not passing upon any prosecution for sedition,
or any violation that should be left to the federal government," 57
though it conceded that disloyalty was the subject of sedition. The
Court urged in support that it could be "logically argued that by
keeping out of state government those persons who might prove disloyal, the federal government would be advantaged."58 This is not
too convincing in view of the statement in the Nelson opinion that
"a state sedition statute is superseded regardless of whether it purports to supplement the federal law."59
The Florida Court's holding, however, that a state can determine
the fitness of its own employees is backed by federal authority.60
Further, loyalty to the state and national governments is a proper
factor determinative of fitness. 61 The United States Supreme Court, in
addition, has recently reiterated its stand that there is no constitutional right to government employment, 62 though a "public servant
whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or dis'
3 comes under the protection of the due process clause.
criminatory"6
Since no discrimination was alleged in the Diez case, the decision
would in all probability enjoy full federal backing.
Section 876.23 of the Florida sedition statutes poses another problem. In this paragraph, overt physical acts pointing to destruction
551d. §876.24.
5697 So.2d 105 (Fla. 1957).
57d. at 108.
58Ibid.
59350 U.S. at 504.
6OSlochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (dictum);
accord, Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
6lGarner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
62Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
631d. at 556, quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
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of the state government are proscribed as felonious. Is this conduct
pre-empted by a federal decision in which advocacy under the Smith
Act only was the issue? The Nelson opinion does not say, but it has
been argued that it implies such coverage. 64 Sabotage and other
physical acts pointing to destruction of a government do not, strictly
speaking, constitute sedition,6 5 but the distinction has often been
overlooked in state statutes. Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision
in the Nelson case speaks of the Internal Security Act and the Communist Control Act, as well as the Smith Act, as aiding in pre-emption
of the sedition field.66 Inasmuch as the first two laws deal with overt
conduct such as sabotage and acts of violence, the mentioning of
these acts in the opinion gives credence to the theory that this type
of conduct also was pre-empted. The decision would in all probability
turn on the question of whether sabotage of national or state government is involved. As to the latter situation the United States Supreme Court said: "Neither does [this decision] . .. limit the right
of the State to protect itself at any time against sabotage or attempted
6
violence of all kinds." 7
Another connected question that is made less clear by the decision
is its application to a situation involving advocacy of overthrow of
a state government only. The Smith Act includes advocacy relating to
a state government, but the question was not at issue in the Nelson
case. Section 876.01 of the Florida act makes seditious conduct confined exclusively to a state punishable, so construction of the decision
as to this point is pertinent to the Florida situation. Other courts
have reluctantly concluded that the Nelson decision inescapably extends to circumstances in which a state government is the sole
target.68 In Commonwealth v. Gilbert9 it was reasoned that even
though the crime under consideration was directed only to the Massachusetts government, it was nevertheless punishable under the Smith
Act and thus came under its pre-emptive intent. Following this
reasoning, however, the court put a judicial foot in the door to keep

the question open: 70

64Note, 2 WAYNE L. REv. 225 (1956).
esSee 47 A. Jtm., Sedition §2 (1943).
66350 U.S. at 503.
67id. at 500.

68Braden v. Kentucky, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956); Commonwealth v. Gilbert,
334 Mass. 71, 134 N.E.2d 13 (1956).
69334 Mass. 71, 134 N.E.2d 13 (1956).
701d. at 75, 134 NXE.2d at 16.
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"We do not wish to be understood as saying that there can
never be any instance of any kind of sedition directed so exclusively against the State as to fall outside the sweep of
Pennsylvania v. Nelson."
Following closely on the heels of this pronouncement came a
Kentucky decision involving an indictment for sedition against both
the state and federal governments. 71 After citing the Nelson case
as controlling, the court enthusiastically adopted the Massachusetts
dictum, expressly referring to it. In its enthusiasm, however, the
Kentucky court apparently extended the Massachusetts rule to all
instances of sedition solely against the state government, thus adding
to the confusion here.
Other questions left unsettled by the Nelson holding are avoided
in this state by the nature of the Florida sedition statutes. Problems
involving mere registration of individuals and groups with the state
police, for instance, and state subversive-investigating commissions
have arisen in other jurisdictions. In Albertson v. Attorney General72
the Michigan court held that state registration of subversives was no
longer permitted under the Nelson decision, but New Hampshire has
held that the decision does not preclude legislative investigations of
subversion. 73 Laws prohibiting the name of any communist nominee
from appearing on a ballot have also been held invalid3- "Next
they will be seeking to abolish the special division of subversive activities set up by the State police ...

to keep track on Communists,"

angrily reports the Attorney General of Massachusetts. 75 The courts,
at any rate, have not been niggardly in giving full force to the letter
and spirit, as they see it, of Pennsylvania v. Nelson.
CONCLUSION

Defense against the communist conspiracy in this country now
appears to be fairly solidly in the hands of the federal government.
The protests and exhortations of state prosecutors and some members
of Congress have been unavailing upon either the judiciary to find
concurrent jurisdiction or the legislature to rewrite congressional in7iBraden v. Kentucky, 291 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1956).
72354 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956).
7Kahn v. Wyman, 100 N.H. 245, 123 A.2d 166 (1956).
74Albertson v. Attorney Gen., 345 Mich. 519, 77 N.W.2d 104 (1956).
75Hearings,supra note 44, at 31.
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